The MZKT (Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant), with its 4.000 workers, is one of the main enterprises of the Belarusian Military Industrial Complex – it is the only Belarusian defense company having a truly strategic importance for the Russian Army. Not without reason, the MZKT was the first enterprise where Lukashenka arrived in August 2020 in order to “calm down” the workers protesting against the falsification of elections and brutal Police violence[1]. This Lukashenka’s visit to the MZKT ended badly for him – unexpectedly, the workers started to shout “Go Away,” and the Belarusian dictator had to leave this top-importance enterprise[2].
1. Strategic role of the MZKT for the Russian Army.
Since the Soviet times, the MZKT has been focused on the production of heavy-duty vehicles and special wheeled chassis designed for transporting extra-heavy equipment (13-80 tons) in all terrain conditions. Traditionally, over 60 different Russian weapon systems use MZKT trucks, including such crucial weapons as nuclear Topol-M and Yars, Iskander-M, S-300/S-400, Rubezh, Bastion, Smerch, Tornado, Buk, Pechora complexes. In this way, a considerable part of the Russian missile weapons (including strategic nuclear forces) is using MZKT trucks.
Despite all Moscow’s efforts taken during the recent two decades, the Russian defense industry failed to replace the MZKT production, so Russia continues to be strategically dependent on this Belarusian enterprise. At the beginning of 2010s, Moscow tried to purchase MZKT from Lukashenka, but he continuously rejected the Russian offers. In 2016, Prime Minister Medvedev announced that KAMAZ would replace MZKT because of Lukashenka’s refusal to sell the enterprise. Another alternative Russian enterprise selected for MZKT replacement was the Bryansk Automobile Plant (part of the Almaz-Antey Holding). As it appeared, despite all efforts, the domestic Russian defense enterprises failed to develop any viable alternatives to the MZKT production – the Russian trucks are still underdeveloped and full of technical problems. According to Russian estimations, the replacement of the MZKT production may cost Russia over 2 billion USD, and this process may take over 10 years. In the present conditions (sanctions, deficit of financing and human resources), this task seems unrealistic for Moscow.
In this way, the critical Russian weapons, including strategic nuclear forces, continue to be heavily dependent on the MZKT production. However, it is important to remember that the MZKT-Russia dependency is mutual – a very significant part of spare parts used by the enterprise is supplied by the Russian partners and over 85-90% of its production is exported to Russia.
2. Role of MZKT for China.
The MZKT continues to have certain military importance for another global nuclear superpower – China. In 1997, MZKT and Beijing established a joint production enterprise “Sanjian-Volat” – very quickly, China managed to copy MZKT technologies, starting to produce its own heavy-duty trucks for military and civilian needs. In this way, with Belarusian assistance, China became one of few countries in the world (besides the USA, Germany and Belarus) able to produce the most complex spare parts for heavy-duty trucks. Despite the fact that China has managed to replicate the MZKT technologies, the cooperation between this enterprise and Beijing continues. Interestingly, in April 2024, the USA imposed sanctions on MZKT and several Chinese companies for assistance to the Pakistan nuclear missile program – as it appeared, with the Chinese assistance, MZKT delivered its trucks for Pakistan’s nuclear missile complexes.
3. MZKT deliveries to Russia in 2024.
Recently, the anti-Lukashenka/pro-opposition Association of Belarusian Railway Workers published an interesting leak about railway deliveries from the MZKT enterprise to Russia for the full year of 2024[3]. This anti-Lukashenka organization regularly leaks important data from the work of the Belarusian Railways, helping to understand the current military and economic processes taking place in Belarus.
According to the leaked information, in 2024, the MZKT delivered to Russia 306 wagons with its production.
There is data on the Russian defence enterprises receiving the MZKT production, so it is possible to understand the types and number of weapons to be installed on the Belarusian heavy trucks in 2024:
— Obukhov Plant (Almaz-Antey Concern, St. Petersburg) — 61 wagons (S-400, air defense equipment, command vehicles for strategic nuclear forces, etc.);
— Titan-Barrikady (Volgograd) — 40 wagons (Iskander-M, Topol-M/Yars, Bereg);
— SKB – Special Construction Bureau (Perm) — 40 wagons (Tornado reactive missile complexes);
— Shumerlya Special Vehicles Plant (Chuvashia region) — 33 wagons (non-lethal equipment — special trucks for auxiliary purposes – evacuation, fixing, etc.);
— Tyazhmash (Samara region) — 33 wagons (non-lethal equipment – various types of special trucks for towing, fixing, etc.);
— Nizhny Novgorod Machine-building Plant (Almaz-Antey Concern, Nizhni Novgorod) — 29 wagons (S-400, air defense complexes);
— NPO Almaz (Almaz-Antey Concern, Moscow) — 27 wagons (S-400, air defense complexes);
— KBP Instrument Design Bureau (Tula) — 18 wagons (Pantsyr-S1 complexes);
— Nitel (Almaz-Antey Concern, Nizhni Novgorod) — 15 wagons (air defense and radiolocation complexes);
— Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol (Almaz-Antey Concern, Izhevsk) — 10 wagons (Tor, Buk complexes).
The number of MZKT wagons delivered to specific Russian defense enterprises helps to understand the scale of production of certain important Russian weapons:
— air defense complexes (142 wagons) — around 50% of all MZKT deliveries to Russia were sent to the five enterprises belonging to the Almaz-Antey Holding, which is the main Russian producer of various air defense complexes (S-400/500, Buk, Tor, radiolocation equipment). This number of MZKT vehicles shows that in 2024, the Holding might have produced three or four S-400 regiments (each regiment contains around 30-40 vehicles). In addition, there could have been produced around ten Buk/Tor complexes on MZKT chassis;
— non-lethal special trucks (66 wagons) – around 20% of MZKT deliveries to Russia are realized for the needs of enterprises producing non-lethal multi-purpose trucks (fixing, towing, etc.);
— Iskander-M and Yars (40 wagons) – the scale of annual production of the mobile version of the nuclear Yars complex is quite limited (around 10 a year) – the rest of the trucks can be used for Iskander complexes ;
— Tornado complexes (40 wagons) – this modernized Smerch complex is actively produced in Russia as a modern form of a reactive missile artillery complex;
— Pantsyr-S1 (18 wagons) – this air defense complex uses the MZKT chassis.
It is important to remember that the number of wagons may not be equal to the number of MZKT trucks delivered to these Russian defense enterprises – depending on the character of a truck, it may occupy one or several railway wagons.
In this way, Lukashenka’s MZKT continues to be the most active supplier of the Russian Army with heavy trucks vitally important for the Russian strategic nuclear forces (Yars), air defense complexes (S-400/500, Tor, Buk, Pantsyr) and the Russian missile forces (Iskander-M).
[1] https://meduza.io/feature/2020/08/17/lukashenko-na-zavode-tyagachey-v-minske-vystupil-pozhaluy-so-svoey-samoy-provalnoy-rechyu-my-pogovorili-s-rabochimi-etogo-predpriyatiya-o-tom-chto-tam-proishodilo
[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f878zy9BdlA&t=6s
[3] https://belzhd.info/military-transportation/eksportnye-obyomy-zheleznodorozhnyh-gruzov-v-rossiyu-za-2024-god-mzkt-i-gruzy-voennogo-naznacheniya/